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Abstract
We relate the design of contract law to the process of development. Contract law
defines which private agreements are enforceable and which are not. Specifically, we con-
sider an economy where agents face a hold-up problem. The resulting time-inconsistency
problem leads to inefficiently low levels of effort and trading among agents. The solution
to this problem requires a social contract which meets two conditions: (i) a judge respon-
sible for the enforcement of the social contract and (ii) a set of non-enforceable private
contracts. However, because this mechanism is costly, it is infeasible in the early stages
of development. The appearance of enforcement institutions and regulation is delayed
for the later stages. At this point of time, the hold-up problem is solved and this spurs
economic growth further. Finally, the relationship between economic development and
the evolution of contract law may be non-monotonic, which may explain why empirical
studies fail to find a robust relationship between the two.
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1 Introduction
The main body of the economic literature on contract theory assumes that private agree-
ments are enforceable by an external authority so that private contracts are binding for
the contracting members1. It is also assumed that the enforcement of all agreements,
which private parties are willing to commit to, increases social welfare. Because the
role of enforcement institutions is obvious in this context, the related papers do not
attempt to explicitly model the enforcement authority and how it achieves its goals.
On the other hand, the literature on economic growth and development has placed
emphasis on the importance of property rights and their enforcement, but contract law
has received disproportionately less attention.
This papers relates the emergence and evolution of contract law to the process of
development. We show that the relationship between the two is reciprocal. As the
process of development unfolds, contract law evolves accordingly and at the same time
it generates new opportunities for economic growth and development. Furthermore,
the relationship between the two may be non-monotonic and hence it is difficult to be
captured by empirical studies. Through the analysis, we also rationalize two stylized
facts of enforcement institutions: i) the existence of institutional agents (such as judges
or bureaucrats) who act on behalf of these institutions and are rewarded for their
function, and ii) the fact that not all types of private agreements are permitted in a
society (regulation).
By contract law we mean the types of private agreements which are enforced by judi-
cial institutions as binding contracts. If a type of private transaction is non-enforceable
this means that judges will not impose the terms of the contract on the transacting
members, even if one of them breaches the initial agreement. Since most agreements
made into contracts are time-inconsistent (i.e. party members do not wish to carry out
their part of the initial promise when the execution time comes), non-enforceability of
certain transactions effectively prohibits them from taking place.
In order to make the points described above, we present a simple economy which
consists of multiple pairs of agents. Each pair is comprised by a producer and a con-
sumer of a specialized good, who face a bilateral hold-up problem. The cost of the
specialized good is uncertain and trade is valuable to both parts only if the low-cost
state materializes, in which case the surplus generated by trade is divided between them
according to their bargaining power. The probability of this event depends on the effort
levels of both the consumer and the producer. The effort levels, the state of nature and
1See for example page 3 in the introduction of “Contract Theory” by Bolton and Dewatripont.
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the utilities of agents are non-verifiable. Because both agents bear the full marginal
cost of effort exertion but receive only part of the marginal benefit, they generally exert
sub-optimal effort levels. The problem could be solved by a mechanism of transfers
contingent on trade, if agents could commit not to make any other private agreement
for transfers of resources. However, this solution is not time-consistent and, as a result,
mechanisms with exogenous full enforcement can not implement the first-best outcome.
In the first part of the paper, we propose a mechanism which solves this time-
inconsistency problem. In our mechanism, the agents themselves decide which contracts
are enforceable and which are not. That is, contract enforcement is endogenous. It
turns out that the implementation of the first-best requires that some contracts be
non-enforceable. Specifically, the mechanism involves a social contract between an
institutional agent, who has the enforcement power in the economy, and the rest of the
agents. The social contract specifies what types of private agreements are enforceable
or not at each point in time and the rewards and punishments for the institutional
agent, if she acts according to its clauses or not. Thus the optimal social contract
specifies ex-post transfers from the trading members to the institutional agent or from
the institutional agent to the trading parties, conditional on the occurrence of trade.
We show that this mechanism can induce agents to exert optimal effort levels and is
renegotiation-proof if: i) at least one agent plays the role of the institutional agent so
that she has a stake to the outcomes generated by the enforcement process and ii) some
forms of private agreements are not enforceable and hence non-credible. However, the
implementation of the institutional design also requires a minimum amount of resources
and so it is inevitably related to the level of economic development.
At this point, we should note this is a model of perfect enforcement. That is,
there are no exogenous frictions on enforcement. It is costless for the judge to obtain
information on verifiable variables and there are no costs for punishing an agent who
did not execute her part of the contract. Furthermore, we do not impose any exogenous
restrictions on the contract space, apart from the condition that contracts should be
written on verifiable variables (the natural one). However, in equilibrium, agents will
choose to render some (otherwise fully enforceable) contracts as non-enforceable, in
order to credibly commit themselves to exert high-effort. In other words, we abstract
away from any possible enforcement friction in order to show that the contractual space
is optimally chosen to be incomplete.
In the second part of the paper we introduce a multi-period economy and connect the
hold-up problem (and its solution) to the process of economic growth and development.
The agents in the economy have access to the production technology of a non-specialized
3
or autarchic good, which exhibits no uncertainty, and to the production technology of
a specialized good in pairs of buyer and seller, exactly as in the previous section. The
economy starts with no initial institutions, but at the beginning of the first period
agents can propose and generate institutions of government and enforcement through
a social contract. Institutional agents play the dual role of the governor and judge
and they are responsible for imposing taxation to agents, spend public revenues to
investments (which increase the productivity of agents), enforce private agreements
and provide reductions in taxation conditional on the trade of the specialized good.
The reductions in taxation work as subsidies which induce agents to exert higher effort
and thus increase the value of trade.
In this economic set-up, the initial level and the rate of increase of productivity in
the production of the autarchic good are the main parameters which drive the evolution
of institutions and growth. The most interesting case is when productivity growth is fast
enough so that the economy passes from multiple stages of development. We identify
the necessary conditions for this case to arise and we derive the following results: i) The
economy starts from low levels of productivity, where the trade of the specialized good
is not feasible, but as productivity increases the feasibility constraints are relaxed.
At a specific point in time trade becomes feasible and enforcement institutions are
created. ii) Restrictions on the set of enforceable private agreements arise endogenously,
inducing trading parties to exert high effort and to increase the value of trade and this
spurs further economic growth. Therefore, the causal relationship between enforcement
institutions and growth goes in both directions. iii) The change of restrictions on the
set of enforceable agreements is non-monotonic to the process of economic growth.
We believe that these results are interesting because they emphasize the recipro-
cal relationship between contract law and growth. More importantly, the relationship
between the two may be non-monotonic. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) test whether
property rights institutions or contract enforcement institutions have a positive impact
on growth. While they find that property rights seem indeed to affect growth positively,
contract institutions do not present a statistically significant impact. Their main hy-
pothesis is that the lower the cost of contract enforcement, the more easily private
parties can contract and hence the greater the impact of economic growth. They test
for this effect by using as a proxy for enforcement costs the legal origin of contract law
(whether it is common law or civil law).
While, our model can not distinguish between the two types of law origins, if one
is willing to assume that enforcement costs are positively correlated with the number
of transactions which are enforceable (which we justify in section 4, in the part where
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we discuss the empirical implications of the model), then we can offer an explanation
to the findings of the empirical literature. With a non-monotonic relationship between
the set of enforceable agreements and the level of growth, the impact of contract law
on the latter can not be captured by linear specifications.
Our results also show that regulation may be optimal for social welfare. Thus,
limiting agents’ economic freedom may have beneficial results if hold-up problems are
prevalent in economic exchanges, a point which goes against the classic economic intu-
ition that more economic freedom implies greater welfare. Apart from the example of
trade of specialized goods, which we provide in this paper, there are many other cases
of economic interest, where a trade-off between ex-ante incentives and ex-post efficiency
may arise. Our framework can be applied in these cases to explain why certain types
of regulation are imposed or why certain types of contracts are forbidden from being
written.
For instance, our model could be used to explain the abolishment of slavery in the
19th century as banning certain property contracts in order to induce the accumulation
of unobservable human capital. It could also be used to rationalize certain laws, which
protect collective bargaining agreements between employees and employers as an effec-
tive banning of one-to-one contracts. This, in turn, increases labour wages and, apart
from redistributive effects, it increases the ex-ante incentives of workers to acquire hu-
man capital. On the other hand, forbidding prenuptial agreements, which may dissolve
dysfunctional partnerships in an effective way ex-post, may be a way into incentivizing
parents in exerting high effort to their family affairs and children up-bringing.
We also believe that our model can be extended to generate a more complete theory
of the trade-off between economic freedom and incentives (ex-post efficiency versus ex-
ante incentives) and it can also provide a model of regulation cycles. Finally, we provide
a different rationale for the existence of institutional agents, such as bureaucrats and
judges. Besides being the executors of authority, they also guarantee the credibility
of the institutions they represent by having a stake in their functionality and by not
always agreeing to change them. Thus institutions acquire persistence, which again is
crucial for their credibility and the solution of hold-up problems.
2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature dealing with the determinants of property rights, their
value for society and development. Examples include Umbeck (1981), Skaperdas (1982),
Grossman (2001) and Gonzalez (2007). On the contrary, there is little work on how en-
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forcement institutions and contract law can affect the development process. A notable
exception is Dhillon and Rigolini (2009), which relates the process of development to
enforcement institutions through the functioning of commodity markets. Our frame-
work differs from theirs in two ways. First, we consider only formal institutions while
their model is concerned with the co-determination of both formal and informal insti-
tutions of enforcement. Second, the process of development in their paper is exogenous
and related to the reliability of the production process to generate high quality goods,
while we are concerned with the co-evolution of contract law and development through
the changes on regulation and productivity respectively.
A different strand of literature examines the impact of limited enforcement on eco-
nomic transactions. Telser (1980) is one of the first papers to model self-enforcing
agreements, while Bull (1987) examines self-enforcing agreements in the context of the
US labor market and Ray (2002) examines their time-structure. However, these pa-
pers are concerned with cases where contract enforcement is impossible and this is an
economic restriction which agents can not overcome. Other papers, like Cooley, Ma-
rimon and Quadrini (2004) and Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2008), are concerned with
the impact of limited enforceability on financial contracting. Krasa and Villamil (2000)
consider the case where enforcement of the contractual agreement is a choice variable
of the contracting members but it is costly and show that the costly state verification
model can be seen as a reduced form of their enforcement problem. None of the above
papers, however, examines the issue of enforceability from the perspective of endogenous
limitations on the types of agreements that are enforced.
On the other hand, there is an extensive literature that is concerned with the issues of
institutional authority. Aghion and Tirole (1997), Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004),
Greif and Laitin (2004), Greif et al (2008), Laffont and Martimort (1998), Sanchez
and Straub (2006) are some of the papers concerned with the issues of authority in
organizations or the endogenous formation of institutions. Our main difference is that
we focus on enforcement institutions and its relationship to the process of economic
development. On top of that, in our analysis we combine both the questions of how
these institutions emerge and evolve and how authority is determined.
Our paper is also related to the literature regarding the hold-up problem. Since the
seminal contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988, 1990),
a long list of papers has been devoted to presenting the inefficiencies generated by this
problem or solving it2. We do not attempt to solve the most general type of hold-up
2See for example Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Che and Hausch (1999), Hart and Moore
(1999), Maskin and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999a), Maskin and Tirole (1999b), Guriev and
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in this paper. We use a simple example of a hold-up problem (which can not be solved
by the mechanisms presented in the papers above) in order to show the importance of
enforcement institutions in solving time-inconsistency problems.
However, Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009) adopt a very similar framework to ours. In
their paper they allow agents to contract with a third party and show that, with an
appropriately designed mechanism, agents can solve their time-inconsistency problem.
Furthermore, they show that side-contracting between the third party and one of the
agents does not alter their results. They apply their framework to the hold-up problem
and to the problem of moral-hazard in teams. We obtain similar results through the
institutional agent. The main differences are two. First, the third party in our paper
has a specific type of authority in the economy (to enforce private agreements or not),
which the third party in their paper does not have. Second, and most important, they
assume that all private agreements are enforceable while we treat enforceability as an
endogenous variable.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature concerned with issues of delegation.
These papers examine the ability of an uninformed principal to extract information
from an informed agent, who is asked to perform a task. Some examples are the papers
by Holmstro¨m (1982), Fershtman, Judd and Kalai (1991), Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and
Martimort (2003), Szalay (2005) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008). While in these
papers delegates act on behalf of a principal, in our model institutional agents are
economy-wide delegates who act on behalf of the society. We also eschew away from
issues of information extraction as we assume that the actions of institutional agents
are fully observable by the rest of the agents.
3 A simple model with two agents
In this section we examine the solution to a static hold-up problem and derive the main
results and intuition which are required for the analysis of the dynamic model.
A plough-maker (say agent j, who is also sometimes referred as the producer) and a
farmer (agent i) face a simple hold-up problem with bilateral externalities. The plough-
maker has the ability to produce one unit of plough g, which is custom-made to satisfy
the farmer’s requirements. This good has valuation equal to v for the farmer in terms
of some numeraire commodity (think of it as the additional quantity of wheat, which
the farmer can produce due to its use).
Kvassov (2005) and Evans (2008)
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However, the cost of the plough, which is again reflected in terms of the numeraire
commodity, is uncertain and depends on the state of nature. There are two states of
nature, one with a high cost (θ1 : k1 = kH) and one with a low cost (θ2 : k2 = kL).
The probability of the low-cost state depends on the effort level of both the producer
and the farmer. The intuition for this assumption is that effort is exerted for acquiring
skills relevant to their occupation. The more skilled the farmer is in cultivating the
land, the higher the chances that he requires a crude, but inexpensive plough to do his
job. Similarly, the more skilled the plough-maker is, the higher the chances that he can
produced the required plough with minimal use of resources3.
If ei and ej are the effort levels exerted by them, then f(ei, ej) is the joint probability
function of the low cost state arising. There are two effort levels for each agent: {e, e} :
e > e. The corresponding cost of effort, which is homogeneous across agents, is given
by: ci(e) = cj(e) = c > ci(e) = cj(e) = c and f(e, e) > f(e, e) = f(e, e) > f(e, e).
The probability function f exhibits decreasing returns to scale: f(e, e) − f(e, e) >
f(e, e)− f(e, e). Also, let 0 < kL < v < kH .
The agents are endowed with a sufficiently large amount of the numeraire commod-
ity w (think of it as wheat or bread)4. Moreover, agents are risk neutral. The utility of
the plough-maker depends only on the amount of the numeraire commodity that she
consumes, but the utility of the farmer also depends on good g. In terms of notation,
uj = x
a
j − cj and ui = xai + Igv − ci, where xaj and xai are the consumption levels of
the numeraire commodity by the producer and the farmer respectively and Ig is an
indicator function that takes the value one if g is traded and zero otherwise. If agents
decide to trade after the state of nature is realized, they divide the gains from trade
according to some exogenous bargaining power5. Let βi (βj) be the bargaining power
of agent i (j), with 0 < βi < 1 and βi+βj = 1. Furthermore, assume that the following
inequalities hold:
3Alternatively, the model can be formulated so that uncertainty is added on the consumption side
of the economy. For instance, the valuation for the plough could be high or low and its probability
can depend on the effort level of the farmer. In this case, there would be four states of nature, but
the main results of the paper would be the same if the trade generates social surplus in only one of
the four states. The economic interpretation would be similar as well, especially if we think of goods
which require some effort from the farmer’s part in order to learn how to use them efficiently.
4for the purposes of this section it is sufficient that w > v − kL
5This can be interpreted as the probability of one side to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
other side.
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[f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ)]βξ(v − kL)− (c− c) < 0,∀eζ ∈ {e, e} (1)
[f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ)](v − kL)− (c− c) > 0,∀eζ ∈ {e, e} (2)
kl − kH + 2 c− c
f(e, e)− f(e, e) > 0 (3)
In the inequalities above, ξ denotes one of the two parts of the transaction (either i or
j) and ζ denotes the other part (if ξ = i, then ζ = j and vice versa). The timing of
events is: first, agents choose effort levels, then the state of nature is determined and
then agents decide whether to trade or not. Committing to trade before uncertainty
is resolved is sub-optimal as it entails welfare losses in the state where the cost of g is
higher than v.
Inequalities (1) and (2) reflect the conditions under which the hold-up problem
arises. Inequality (1) states that, independent of the effort level of the other agent, the
marginal benefit of increasing the effort level for type ξ is lower than the marginal cost of
doing so, while (2) states that, under the same conditions, the marginal social benefit
exceeds the marginal social cost, which is equal to the private cost. In conjunction,
inequalities (1) and (2) imply that it is a dominant strategy for both types of agents to
exert low effort, but this is socially sub-optimal.
In fact, adding inequality (2) for different effort levels and types, one can show that
[f(e, e)−f(e, e)](v−kL)−2(c−c) > 0, which means that if both agents choose to exert
high effort the aggregate social benefit is positive. In other words, the two conditions
form a simple model of a hold-up problem: both agents would benefit from exerting
high effort but because they receive only a part of the social surplus they generate, they
do not have an incentive to do so.
Inequality (3), on the other hand, is a technical condition, which is required for
making the incentive compatibility problem meaningful. As we show in the proof of
Proposition 1, when this condition holds, subsidizing trade in order to induce high
effort, without any restrictions on enforceable agreements, is ineffective, because agents
prefer to trade in the high cost in order to receive the subsidies and redistribute them
among themselves.
Effort levels, effort costs, the state of nature and the level of utility of each agent
are observable but non-verifiable. In addition, the effort levels of the agents are non-
transferable, so that property rights can not solve the problem. This is a plausible
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assumption since in many cases of economic interest the economic surplus may depend
on the actions of some individuals which can not be easily replicated by others. In
our example, the plough-maker has a specific set of skills which are needed for the
production of the good, which the farmer does not have and can not acquire.
If effort choices were transferable, an easy solution to this problem would be the
allocation and trade of property rights on the effort decisions (see also Grossman and
Hart, 1986). Also, if any of the non-verifiable variables, could be verified, even at some
cost, then the agents could design mechanisms of subsidy provision or punishments
in order to induce the first-best effort levels. For example, if the state of nature were
costlessly verifiable, then the following mechanism would implement the first-best effort
levels: the farmer and the plough-maker give out τi = f(e, e)(1 − βi)(v − kL) and
τj = f(e, e)βi(v − kL) units of the numeraire commodity to a risk-neutral agent, who
has the obligation to return to them si = (1 − βi)(v − kL) and sj = βi(v − kL) units
respectively, if the low-cost state arises. In such a case, agents receive a subsidy in the
low-cost case which aligns the marginal costs and benefits of effort exertion to the social
costs and benefits and therefore achieves first-best outcomes.
Of course, as the relevant literature points out (see for example Hart and Moore
(1988) or Maskin and Tirole (1999b)), the problem with such a mechanism is that truth-
telling about the state of nature is not incentive compatible when the states of nature
are non-verifiable. If the high-cost state arises, agents have incentive to lie in order
to receive and redistribute the subsidies between them. Such redistributions require
binding agreements on net transfers of resources. Ex-ante, agents prefer to ban such
transfers, so that the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility and generates optimal
incentives for effort provision, but ex-post agents prefer to renegotiate the mechanism
and allow for the transfers to take place. Therefore, this mechanism fails to provide
incentives for efficient effort exertion, because it is not renegotiation-proof and, hence,
credible.
This section of the paper shows how this problem can be circumvented by the in-
troduction of an institutional agent, a type of delegate, who enforces the mechanism
and whose final payoff depends on the outcome of the mechanism. In this case, be-
cause the institutional agent has an incentive to block any renegotiation that reduces
his expected payoff, we show that an endogenous commitment not-to-renegotiate the
mechanism arises ex-post. Furthermore, the enforceability of ex-post transfers and the
incentives of the institutional agent arise endogenously, through the ex-ante social
contract between the agents and their delegate.
For the rest of this section we assume the timing of events as represented by Figure
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1, which is similar to the one adopted by Watson (2007). Before proceeding to the main
result of the section, we provide the necessary definitions.
Time
0: Players establish social contract
1: Consumer and producer exert effort
2: Possible renegotiation of social contract
3: State of nature is determined
4: Possible renegotiation of social contract
5: Private contract between producer and consumer 
6: Institutional agent gives subsidies conditional on trade
7: Enforcement of social and private contract
Figure 1: Timing of Events
Definition 1: An institutional agent (Σ = 1) is a third party whose actions and
rewards are determined by the agents through a social contract. The action set of the
institutional agent is the payment of subsidies to the agents and the enforcement or not
of private contracts.
Definition 2: A private contract pi(q, p(g), Ig) is any agreement between the farmer
and the plough-maker. This formulation includes agreements for selling good g at a
price p(g), agreements which promise a net transfer of resources q conditional on the
trade and the price of good g (side contracts) and agreements for an unconditional
transfer of resources q (irrespectively of trade). Q is the set of all possible contracts.
Whether a subset of Q is enforceable or not depends on the social contract.
Definition 3: A social contract S(Σ,Φ(Q), τ) is a contract between the farmer,
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the plough-maker and potentially (but not necessarily) an institutional agent, which
defines ex-post transfers τ conditional on the verifiable trade of the good g and on its
price p(g)6, the inclusion of the institutional agent or not (Σ = 1 or Σ = 0, respectively)
and the set of enforceable private agreements Φ(Q).
We assume that even if an institutional agent is not included in the social contract,
the farmer and the plough-maker can still utilize the enforcement authority of the
economy (which we treat as an automaton or a machine in that case). We do this
so that we can contrast our results with the existing literature, which assumes that
enforcement authorities exist but they are not explicitly modeled. In particular, we
want to show why the incompleteness of the contractual space and the structure of
incentives for the institutional agent as well, are so important for solving the hold-up
problem.
However, in the analysis that follows we implicitly assume that the judge is punished
if he violates his part of the agreement with the other two agents, and hence he is bound
to execute the social contract, unless they all agree to renegotiate it7. Also notice that
the cases of exogenous enforcement with complete or incomplete set of enforceable
agreements are special cases of social contracts in our framework. In section 4, we
make the more realistic assumption that the economy starts of from a point of no
institutions and we derive their emergence, evolution and structure endogenously.
Propositions 1 and 2 below show the role of contract law for solving the hold-up
problem. The main intuition is that, in order to induce agents to exert high effort, sub-
sidization of trade is required. However, once the high-cost state materializes, agents
may have an incentive to conduct trade, even if it is suboptimal, in order to receive the
subsidies. Stopping them from doing so requires limitations to the maximum amount of
net transfers that the farmer can provide to the producer. However, these limitations,
though optimal from an ex-ante point of view, are not credible ex-post. Without an
institutional agent, who bears the cost of subsidies and the benefits of taxation, the
agents would simply undo the regulation they set in place after the state of nature
realizes. Therefore, a credible solution to this time-inconsistency problem requires a
6Ex-post transfers can be either positive (subsidization) or negative (taxation).
7Of course, the important question of what ensures the compliance of the institutional agent with
the social contract is omitted from our analysis. However, one way to deal with this issue is to assume
an infinitely lived judge and construct a reward structure for him and trigger-strategies for the rest of
the agents, such that the compliance with the social contract is self-enforced. We leave this interesting
direction for future work.
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judge, who enforces regulation and who has a stake on the function of the enforcement
institutions. In other words, the solution to the hold-up problem is not imposed ex-
ogenously, but arises as the equilibrium outcome of an institutional process (the social
contract).
Proposition 1: Let p = kH + βj(v − kL) − c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) . Consider the social contract
S∗, which defines:
i) if trade of good g takes place, agent ξ receives subsidy (negative taxation)
τξ1 = (1− f(e, e))
(
βξ(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
< 0.
ii) if trade of good g does not takes place, agent ξ pays out taxation
τξ0 = f(e, e)
(
−βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
> 0.
iii) any private contract pi(0, pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or qˆ > p − p is non-
enforceable.
Then S∗ implements the first best effort levels and it is renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 2: The existence of the institutional agent and the non-enforcement of
private contracts contingent on trade are necessary conditions for the implementation
of first-best effort levels.
The proofs of the propositions are provided in Appendix I. Given these results, one
can also see the implications of this mechanism for development. Social contracts can
solve the hold-up problem as long as there is sufficient production to be taxed and
provided as subsidies. At the early stages of development, production is relatively low
and the mechanism is infeasible. As a result, there is low effort exertion and low prob-
ability of trade. Once productivity increases sufficiently, then the mechanism becomes
feasible and this implies the emergence of regulation, which is necessary to support
high effort levels. In turn, the probability and the marginal value of trade increase,
which encourages more investments to the know-how of the specialized good and pro-
motes productivity growth further. Therefore, a feedback mechanism emerges between
economic growth and enforcement institutions. The following section formalizes these
arguments and shows why the relationship between the two may be non-monotonic.
4 Enforcement Institutions and Development
This section links the process of economic development with contract law. Formally,
the model follows closely the notation and assumptions of the previous section. The
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economy lasts for T periods and consists of two groups of agents, each one of which is
represented by a continuum of measure one. The group i are buyers (farmers) of the
specialized good and group j are sellers (plough-makers). Each seller j can produce a
specific variety of an intermediary good g, which a specific buyer i can use to generate
additional production of the numeraire commodity (good a). In each period, a random
matching process matches one agent from group i with one from group j and together
they form an exclusive partnership8. Apart from their specialization in a specific variety
of g, the partnerships are identical and thus we use i and j as the notation for the
representative buyer-seller party.
The structure of the production for the specialized good is the same as in section
3, but we allow the gains from trade to vary over time by a scaling factor Γt
9. Γt is
a positive coefficient, common for the whole economy, which can be interpreted as the
productivity on agents’ effort levels for good g. Agents can save resources (in terms
of the numeraire commodity) and invest in an aggregate, non-depreciable amount of
capital Zg which increases the value of trade Γt. We assume that Γt is a concave function
of Zg.
In addition to the specialized good g, both agents have access to the production
technology of the numeraire commodity a, which can be thought of as a non-specialized
or “autarchic” good (we refer to any these terms interchangeably). The output of this
good in each period is a linear non-stochastic function of the economy-wide productivity
variable At and of the effort level an agent exerts for its production: yξt = Ateξat, where
yξt is the production of good a in period t by an agent of type ξ and eξat is the effort
level exerted by her10. Unlike the effort levels for the production of good g, we assume
that the effort level for the production of good a is continuous and the cost of effort
cξat is a convex function of eξat with
∂cξat
∂eξat
> 0,
∂2cξat
(∂eξat)2
> 0. The total cost of effort for
an agent is the summation of the two efforts: cξt = cξat + cξgt.
The productivity variables At and Γt are common for all agents. Furthermore,
their values depend on two types of cumulative, non-depreciable capital, Za and Zg
respectively. These capital levels can be interpreted as the technological know-how
of the economy for the production of the non-specialized and the specialized good
8This means that the buyer has the know-how of using only a specific variety of the good g, which
is produced by only a specific seller and the appropriate variety changes randomly every year.
9So, good g yields Γtv units of good a to the appropriate buyer, its cost takes values ΓtkH or ΓtkL
and the cost of effort by an agent ξ for g in period t is Γtcξgt. Also, conditions (1) and (2) hold.
10i has an increased production of good a if she buys the appropriate variety of the specialized good.
This is additional to yiat.
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respectively11. Agents can choose to save amounts of the non-specialized good and
invest into the two forms of capital. However, due to the infinitesimal size each agent
and the fact that productivities are common for all, private savings are zero. Hence,
we ignore private savings in the analysis and consider public taxation and investment,
conducted by a governor.
Let zat, zgt be the aggregate investment to the production process a and g respec-
tively in period t. We also assume that At(Za) and Γt(Zg) are concave functions of
the respective capital stocks, satisfying the following conditions: A(0) > 0, Γ(0) >
0, Inada condition: A′(0) = Γ′(0) = ∞. Assuming that the economy starts with zero
capital stocks (Za0 = Zg0 = 0), the first two conditions guarantee that some production
is attainable even with zero capital stocks while the last two conditions guarantee that
at least some investment in productivity is socially beneficial.
Agents are risk-neutral. The state-dependent utility is the summation of production
of a, gains from trade, taxation and cost of effort:
uiθt = yit + Ig(Γtv − p)− τigt − (ciat + cigt)
ujθt = yjt + Ig(p− kθ)− τjgt − (cjat + cjgt)
Uξ =
T∑
t=0
δt
(∑
θ
fθ(eξgt, eζgt)uξθt
)
In terms of the timing of events, every period is split into sub-periods which roughly
follow the order of events of section 3. In the beginning of period zero the agents of
the economy propose and vote social contracts, which establish the main institutions
of government and enforcement in the economy. Thereafter, in every period t, agents
decide how much effort to exert on autarchic and specialized production, the state
of nature is determined, and agents decide whether to trade or not and sign private
contracts. Once production (and potentially trade) has taken place, the institutional
agent imposes taxation (conditional on trade) and decides whether to enforce certain
private agreements. Finally, consumption takes place. Figure 2 presents the sub-stages
of the game and the timing of events for every period after period zero.
The social contract S is similar to section 3, with three main differences: i) Given
that it is proposed in period 0, it is an exhaustive plan of all future dates. ii) It includes
investment plans za, zg for increasing respective productivities A and Γ, so S takes now
11Alternatively, we could allow the capital levels to also depend on effort and think of the relative cost
in terms of foregone production, but the mathematical formulation of the two problems is identical.
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Time
Effort exertion
Production costs are determined
Private contracts are signed 
1
2
3
Trade takes place. Government executes taxation and investment plans 
in productivity growth
Enforcement of private contracts
Consumption takes place
4
5
6
Figure 2: Timing of Events
the form: S(Σ,Φ(Q), τ, za, zg). iii) Σ can contain multiple agents. In this context, an
institutional agent can be thought of as a governor and a judge at the same time (there
is no separation of powers).
As mentioned above, in the beginning of the game any agent of the economy can
propose a social contract. A proposal becomes a valid social contract if all agents vote
for it (unanimity requirement), even if there is only one proposal made12. If no proposal
achieves the unanimity requirement, then there is no government and enforcement insti-
tutions in the economy, and agents can utilize only the autarchic production technology.
In this case, the game proceeds with effort exertion, production and consumption under
autarchy in each period13.
Also notice that the unanimity requirement for the selection of the social contract
acts as a participation constraint. If the enforcement of a proposed social contract gives
12This means that agents have the option of not voting at all.
13The state of nature is inconsequential for autarchic production and therefore it is omitted from
the analysis of these sub-games
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lower utility to an agent than the utility of autarchy, then the agent can block the social
contract by not voting for it. Therefore, there can be no equilibrium of the game where
the final expected utility for a subset of agents is below their autarchic continuation
utility. For the rest of the section, when we refer to participation constraints, we imply
the autarchic utility level that each agent receives in each period.
On the other hand, any proposal that generates a Pareto undominated allocation
and satisfies the participation constraints of all agents can be an equilibrium of the
game. This is again a result of the unanimity requirement, since it gives veto power
to players14. In the analysis of the following sub-sections we analyze only one of the
equilibria of the game, the equilibrium where the proposed social contract is designed
so as to maximize the summation of the utilities of all non-institutional agents, given
that it satisfies the participation constraint of the institutional agents15.
If a certain social contract is voted in the beginning period zero, the selected institu-
tional agents do not exert effort in the production process. In other words, we assume
that the activities of the institutional agent and production are mutually exclusive16.
The rest of the agents decide on how much effort to exert in producing the generic good
or investing effort for the specialized good and whether to trade or not.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the problem, it is worth mentioning that in-
stitutional agents play a dual role in this model. They are both governors and judges
at the same time. They are governors because they collect taxes from the rest of the
agents and allocate them to public spending, i.e. investments to the two types of pro-
ductivities. They are also judges because the enforce private agreements. This dual role
seems to better fit the role of monarchs in pre-industrial economies. In this paper we
do not examine the potential reasons behind the separation of powers in post-industrial
economies. Our main focus are the questions of when do restrictions on enforcement
arise and how they affect the development path of the economy.
14The analysis of this result is available from the author upon request.
15We effectively compute the social contract which arises from a Nash-bargaining procedure which
allocates an equal bargaining coefficient on both types. The general set of equilibria, with unrestricted
coefficients can also be derived, however, we simplify the analysis by examining only the limiting case
of equal bargaining power.
16One consequence of this assumption is that occupation in institutions generates a cost in terms
of foregone production and hence a trade-off between the functionality of institutions and productive
capacity. It also implies a simple solution to this trade-off: the minimization of the set of institutional
agents. Relaxing this assumption can generate a more interesting trade-off and richer model predictions
for institutions but it would lead us astray from the main topic of the paper. We leave this aspect of
the problem for future work.
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4.1 Agents’ Maximization Problem and Best-Response Func-
tions
An agent of type ξ, who is occupied with production activities, chooses effort levels
eξgt and eξat in each period t in order to maximize his utility, given an accepted social
contract S (and the implied values of τξgt, At, Γt). Each pair (i, j) also exchange g on
the “fair” price p∗ = Γt((1 − βi)v + βikL), if its cost is low or if the contract law does
not allow (side-)payments which violate incentive compatibility. Otherwise, they ex-
change good g for the price: p+q. Assume the former case17. In this case agent ξ solves:
max
{eξat,eξgt}
A(Zat−1)eξat+f(eigt, ejgt) (Γ(Zgt−1)βξ(v − kL)− τξ1t)+(1− f(eigt, ejgt) (−τξ0t)
−Γ(Zgt−1)cigt − ciat (4)
The solution to problem (4) is given by:
eξat : A(Zat−1) =
∂cξat
∂eξat
(5)
{
eξgt = e if τξ0t − τξ1t > −Γ(Zgt−1)[(f(e,eζ)−f(e,eζ))βξ(v−kL)−(c−c)]f(e,eζ)−f(e,eζ)
eξgt = e otherwise
(6)
Since the value of of eξgt also depends on the choice of effort of the trade-partner ζ,
equations (5) and (6) give the best-response function of agent ξ.
As far as institutional agents are concerned, they do not directly engage in pro-
ductive activities. Their utility is a function of the total taxes they collect minus the
resources they invest in Za, Zg. Though we do not model it explicitly in the social
contract, one can ensure the compliance of institutional agents by including certain
rewards and punishments, conditional on its execution or not.
Denote by r+σ the reward of an institutional agent for executing the social contract
and by r−σ her punishment if she deviates. Her reward is equal to the aggregate taxes
she collects minus the aggregate investments in physical capitals:
r+σ = f(ei, ej)(miτσi1t +mjτσj1t) + (1− f(ei, ej)) (miτσi0t +mjτσj0t)− zσat − zσgt
17We will shortly show a similar condition to condition iii) of Proposition 1, which ensures incentive
compatibility and the “fair” price.
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In the expression above, mi, mj is the total mass of agents of type i and j respec-
tively, who are occupied in productive activities (non-institutional agents) and σ is
the institutional agent, who is asked to execute the taxation plan τσ and investment
plans zσa, zσg. On the other hand, if the institutional agent executes different plans
in period t, say {τ ′σξθt, z′σat, z′σgt}, for ξ ∈ {i, j}, for θ ∈ {0, 1}, then her utility is
the aggregate units of the autarchic goods she accumulates according to her plan minus
her punishment. By adding and subtracting r+σ and by using the equation above, we get:
f(ei, ej)
(
mi(τ
′
σi1t − τσi1t) +mj(τ ′σj1t − τσj1t)
)
+ (1− f(ei, ej)) (mi(τ ′σi0t − τσi0t)
+mj(τ
′
σj0t − τσj0t)
)− (z′σat − zσat)− (z′σgt − zσgt) + r+σ − r−σ .
This states that the utility of the institutional agent is the utility she would receive by
executing the policy plans of the social contract, plus the extra resources of the new
taxation, minus the additional expenses by the new investment plans minus the penalty
defined by the social contract for deviating from the original agreement. It is clear that
as long as the punishment for deviation is lower than the net additional resources, the
institutional agent will choose to deviate.
In fact, the optimal choice of the institutional agent is to tax all production of
the non-specialized good so as to maximize the net resources from deviation. Such a
behavior can be prevented, of course, by setting the penalty of deviation sufficiently
high. Lemma 2 in Appendix I provides the necessary rewards and punishments for an
institutional agent, so that her participation constraint is satisfied, while maintaining
her incentives for executing the social contract. For the rest of the analysis we suppress
this problem from the analysis.
4.2 The Optimal Design of Contract Law
Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal set of institutional agents. Proposition 3 charac-
terizes the optimal design of contract law and follows from Proposition 1. Both proofs
are provided in Appendix I.
Lemma 1: The optimal social contract S∗ determines that the set Σ is of measure
zero. That is, the total number of institutional agents is infinitesimal compared to the
aggregate population.
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The intuition of Lemma 1 is simple. Since productive and government activities are
mutually exclusive and there is no limit to the span of control in governance, having
a strictly positive measure of institutional agents is a social waste of resources: it re-
duces the productive capacity of the economy without generating any additional benefit.
Therefore, the minimization of Σ is the optimal option. In other words, the optimal
social contract defines that the number of institutional agents is finite, so that some
institutional agents exist. However, the exact number is indeterminate, as they do not
impact the aggregate economy due to the continuum-of-agents assumption. Without
loss of generality, henceforth we assume that there is only one institutional agent in
equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Let p = Γ(Zgt−1)
(
kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(ei,e)−f(ei,e)
)
. Incentive com-
patibility requires that any private contract pi(0, pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or
qˆ > p− p is non-enforceable.
Proof: See Appendix I
Proposition 3 gives the necessary regulation required to support an incentive compatible
subsidization scheme, which parallels that of Proposition 1. Notice that p, which stands
for the maximum transfer allowed between the two agents when trade takes place, de-
pends on the values of Γt, the productivity of the specialized good, and the induced
effort level ei. These are endogenous variables which change over time and, therefore,
regulation is dynamic. While the impact of Γt has a positive effect on p (meaning
that it relaxes the incentive compatibility condition), the evolution of ei has a negative
impact on p, and the two effects generate a non-monotonic relationship between the op-
timal contract law and development. We analyze this effect in more detail in section 4.4.
4.3 Unconstrained optimal taxation and investment plans
A consequence of the result stated in the Lemma 1 is that the utility of the institutional
agent is infinitesimally small compared to the utility of the agents employed in produc-
tive activities and hence it can be ignored in the determination of the optimal social
contract. Provided the optimal values for Σ and Φ(Q) (by Lemma 1 and Proposition 3),
the rest of the variables included in the social contract are given as the solution to the
problem which maximizes the expected utility of both types of agents with respect to
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taxation and investment plans and subject to the incentive compatibility, government
budget and feasibility constraints:
max
∫ ( T∑
t=0
δt
(∑
θ
fθ(eξgt, eζgt)uit
))
di+
∫ ( T∑
t=0
δt
(∑
θ
fθ(eξgt, eζgt)ujt
))
dj ⇔
max
1
2
T∑
t=0
[
δt [A(Zat−1)e∗iat + f(eigt, ejgt) (Γ(Zgt−1)βi(v − kL)− τi1t) + (1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (−τi0t)− ciat − cigt]
]
+
1
2
T∑
t=0
[
δt
[
A(Zat−1)e∗jat + f(eigt, ejgt) (Γ(Zgt−1)βj(v − kL)− τj1t) + (1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (−τj0t)− cjat − cjgt
]]
(7)
With respect to: {τ, za, zg}, and subject to:
Best Response Function of type i (8)
Best Response Function of type j (9)
τj0t − τj1t 6 Γ(Zgt−1)kH − (p+ q) Incentive Compatibility Constraint for type j (10)
zat + zgt 6 f(eigt, ejgt)(τi1t + τj1t) + (1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (τi0t + τj0t)
Government Budget Constraint (11)
f(eigt, ejgt) (τi1t + τj1t)+(1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (τi0t+τj0t) 6 A(Zat−1)(eiat+ejat)−f(eigt, ejgt)kL
Feasibility Constraint (12)
Due to the risk neutrality of the utility functions of agents, the concavity of pro-
ductivity functions A(Za), Γ(Zg) and the Inada condition, the optimal taxation and
investment plans take the form of a stopping-time problem: at the beginning of the
economy, when the marginal productivity of investment is higher than the marginal
value of consumption, the institutional agent taxes all income from the other agents
to fund investments in productivity. At some threshold value of productivity, taxa-
tion drops and no further investments are made. Non-taxable production is consumed
thereafter.
However, trade between agents and inducing high effort levels for one of the types
(or both) require specific threshold level of production of the non-specialized good,
which are endogenously determined by investment plan za. Specifically, trade can take
place between i and j only if the non-specialized production of agent i is sufficient to
cover the cost of production in the low-cost state:
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A(Zat−1)eiat > kL (13)
Inducing high effort for one type of agent requires that the aggregate production of the
non-specialized good minus the expected production costs of the specialized good are
greater than the expected reduction in taxation:
A(Zat−1) (eiat + ejat)− f(e, eζ)Γ(Zgt−1)kL > f(e, eζ)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)
[
βmin (f(e, e)− f(e, e) (v − kL)− (c− c)
]
f(e, e)− f(e, e)
)
(14)
Similarly, incentivizing both agents to exert high effort level requires:
A(Zat−1) (eiat + ejat)− f(e, e)Γ(Zgt−1)kL > f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1) [β
max (f(e, e)− f(e, e)) (v − kL)− (c− c)]
f(e, e)− f(e, e)
)
+ f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)
[
βmin (f(e, e)− f(e, e)) (v − kL)− (c− c)
]
f(e, e)− f(e, e)
)
(15)
In inequalities (14),(15), βmin = min{βi, βj} and βmax = max{βi, βj}. It is easy to
solve the problem when these constraints are not binding, which is the case when the
initial value of productivity for the non-specialized good is sufficiently high. In this
case the optimal social plan induces both agents to exert high effort level by reducing
taxation in the low-cost state and increasing it in the high-cost state (which are truth-
fully revealed through trade). It also increases capital stocks in period zero up to the
point where the future marginal increase in production is equal to the marginal cost of
production for both goods. Formally, this solution is defined by the equations below:
τξ0t − τξ1t = −Γ(Zgt−1) [βξ (f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ)) (v − kL)− (c− c)]
f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ) for ξ ∈ {i, j}
za0 such that:
T∑
t=1
δt
∂A(Za0)
∂Za
(e∗ia(Za0) + e
∗
ia(Za0)) = 1 , where Za0 = za0
zg0 such that:
T∑
t=1
δt
∂Γ(Zg0)
∂Zg
(f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c) = 1 , where Zg0 = zg0
The above equations characterize the problem only for very high values of A(0). If A(0)
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is such that any of the feasibility constraints (13)-(15) is not satisfied at time t = 0,
then the optimal investment plan za depends on the marginal benefits and costs of
prolonging investment in future periods. The benefits come from the increased future
production of the autarchic good and satisfying the minimum production level required
for trade to take place or for providing subsidies18. The costs come from the value of
foregone consumption in the period of investment.
Due to the fact that equations (13) to (15) define threshold values, which are de-
termined endogenously by past investment and taxation, there are multiple different
cases to consider regarding optimal investment and taxation plans. Diagrams 1 to 3 in
Appendix II provide all possible cases, but in the following subsection we examine only
the most interesting of these cases. Before doing so, we define some useful threshold
values, which will be used in the analysis thereafter. The following threshold values
K(Zgt−1) and K(Zgt−1) represent the aggregate production of the autarchic good re-
quired for the subsidization of one or two types of agents respectively form equations
(14) and (15).
Let K(Zgt−1) = f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)[β
min(f(e,e)−f(e,e))(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
+ f(e, e)kL
Let K(Zgt−1) = f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)[β
min(f(e,e)−f(e,e))(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
+ f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)[βmax(f(e,e)−f(e,e))(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
+ f(e, e)kL
As before, βmin = min{βi, βj} , βmax = max{βi, βj}. Define by Z˜a, Za, Za the
minimum require physical capital of type a, such that the inequalities (13) to (15) hold
respectively at time zero. Formally:
Z˜a : A(Z˜a)e
∗
ia(Z˜a) = kL
Za : A(Za)
(
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
)
= K(0)
Za : A(Za)
(
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
)
= K(0)
18Which generate extra value by increasing the volume of trade of the specialized good.
23
If the solutions to the above equations do not exist (and since effort exertion is an
increasing function of productivity), there are two possible cases to consider for each
equation. Either the required value of Za is so low that it violates the non-negativity
constraint for the capital stock or the limit lim
Za→∞
A(Za)(eiat + ejat) is lower than the
required threshold.
The first case is the case where A(0) is sufficiently high so that feasibility constraints
for trade and effort exertion are not binding and we go back to the analysis of the
unconstrained problem provided above. In the second case, the respective feasibility
constraint is always binding, which implies that either trade will never take place,
irrespectively of the capital stock of the economy, or inducing high effort for at least
one or both agents is not attainable. However, the second class of results can also
arise in the case where the required capital stock for trade (or inducing high effort) is
attainable, but the cost of foregone consumption is too high and such an investment
plan is not optimal. Therefore, in terms of economic consequences, we lose nothing by
restricting our attention to the cases where the critical values Z˜a, Za and Za exist and
are non-negative.
The importance of these thresholds is that we can examine the optimal investment
and taxation plans when one of these constraints is more difficult to satisfy than the
others. Notice that because K(Zgt) is always greater than K(Zgt), then Za > Za,
which means that feasibility constraint (15) is always more difficult to satisfy than
(14). Furthermore, for each one of these critical values and given some plan za, which
utilizes all non-specialized production in each period for investments in productivity
and subsidizing effort levels, there exists a point t in time such that the accumulated
capital stock Za reaches the respective critical value. Define t˜, t and t as the respective
points in time and assume that each one of them is less than T. Under these assumption
and results we examine the following case of interest.
4.4 An Economy with non-Monotonic Regulation
We now analyze the case where the three feasibility constraints (13)-(15) are binding at
time zero. We derive the required conditions on parameter values so that the economy
passes through the different stages of economic development (no-trade, trade with low
effort levels, trade with high effort levels). We also find the conditions for regulation to
change non-monotonically over these stages. Enforcement institutions are required at
the point where productivity in good a is high enough to support trade, but contract
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law becomes relevant only when subsidization of trade for at least one type is feasible.
In turn, the increase in the trade of good g, generated by regulation, spurs further
economic growth by increasing its marginal value and this leads to further investments
in the productivity of this good. Therefore, we claim that the interaction between
markets and institutions goes in both directions19.
As before, there are different combinations of assumptions that can give similar
qualitative results in our model20. We examine the conditions that present the most
detailed interpretation of economic development and enforcement institutions evolution.
The main requirement is that the continuation value of investment in productivity of
goods a and g is greater than the cost of foregone consumption in all three threshold
points (t˜, t, t). This generates optimal investment paths for five different stages of
development: [0, t˜], [t˜, t], [t, t], [t, t∗] and [t∗, T ]. These are described below:
Stage 1: [0, t˜]
Assume that Z˜a < Za < Za. This implies that the most difficult to satisfy constraint
is the subsidization of both types of agents. Define t˜ as the time period which satisfies
the following condition and growth path:
t˜∑
t=0
zat = Z˜, zat = A(Zt−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1) and assume
that ∂A(Z˜a)
∂Z˜a
[e∗ia(Z˜a) + e
∗
ja(Z˜a)]
(
T∑
t=t˜
δt−t˜
)
> 1. The last assumption means that the net marginal
benefit of investment za at the critical value Z˜a is positive, so that investment in the
productivity of good a must continue beyond this threshold. Therefore, zat follows the
state-independent growth path zat = A(Zt−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1) up to time t˜. Call this
investment plan IP ∗
t˜
. During stage 1, productivity for good a is low and the autarchic
production of type i is not sufficient for covering the cost of production of good g in
any state. Trade does not take place, but production of a is taxed away and invested
in increasing Za.
Stage 2: [t˜, t]
Define t such that: Z˜a +
t∑
t=t˜+1
zat = Za
zat, zgt are defined by the following investment paths:
zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zgt)f(e, e)kL , Zgt = Zgt−1 + zgt and zat = 0
19The paper by Dhillon and Rigolini is also important in that respect, as the determination of prices
and the use of formal and informal channels of enforcement arise endogenously. Our main focus is on
the impact of the design of contract law.
20See Appendix II.
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if ∂A(Zat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zat > 0 and zat , zgt are such the marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
,
zat + zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zgt−1)f(e, e)kL
Call the optimal investment path above IP ∗t . At time t˜ there is enough production of
good a by agents of type i, so that trade arises in the economy, but, since Za > Z˜a, there
is not enough production for subsidizing effort exertion. This constraint holds until the
physical capital reaches the critical value Za, which happens in period t. Also at the
same time (t˜) enforcement institutions emerge but no restrictions on enforceability are
required.
On the other hand, after t˜, due to the Inada conditions, investment takes place
in productivity Γ and the optimal investment plan must divide available production
between za and zb. The optimal rule is to invest production to the productivity of
good g only, until the marginal returns of production are equalized between goods a
and g. Thereafter, investment is divided between the two goods so as to maintain the
equality of marginal returns. This is represented by the first (the “if”) and second (the
“otherwise”) part respectively of IP ∗t .
Stage 3: [t, t]
The main logic and intuition proceeds in the same way as in stage 2. Define t such
that: Za +
t∑
t=t+1
zat = Za. Furthermore assume that:
∂A(Za)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
∂Γ(Zgt)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zat−1)
(
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zgt−1) (f(e, e)v − c− c)
]
>
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zˆat−1)
(
eˆ∗ia(Zˆat−1) + eˆ
∗
ja(Zˆat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zˆgt−1) (f(e, e)v − 2c)
]
The first two conditions ensure that it is optimal to invest both in the productivity of
good a and g beyond time period t, at which point there is enough production of good
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a so that one of the two agents can be subsidized to exert high effort. Notice that the
marginal benefit of one of the agents exerting high effort is the same irrespectively of
who is subsidized, due to the symmetry of the probability function in terms of effort
levels. However, the subsidy required for inducing high effort is lower for the agent with
the lower bargaining power. This is the reason why we have defined Za to depend on
βmin. Let us assume that type ξ is the one with the low bargaining power.
At time t, it is optimal for type ξ to receive subsidy conditional on trade, if the
overall social surplus from the increased probability of trade and the slower increase in
productivity is greater than the social surplus under the lower probability of trade but
the faster increase in productivity. This trade-off between the probability of trade and
productivity growth comes from the fact that both must be funded from the taxation
imposed on agents and they both face ultimately the same feasibility constraint. The
third condition ensures that paying out subsidies to one type of agents Pareto domi-
nates not paying subsidies at all. The investment path with partial subsidies {za, zg}
and without any subsidies {zˆa, zˆg}, are given below:
zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zgt) , Zgt = Zgt−1 + zgt, zat = 0 ,
if ∂A(Zat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zat > 0 and zat , zgt are such the marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− c− c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
,
zat + zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zgt−1)
zˆgt = A(Zˆat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zˆgt)f(e, e)kL , Zˆgt = Zˆgt−1 + zˆgt, zˆat = 0
if ∂A(Zˆat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zˆat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˆat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zˆgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zˆat > 0 and zˆat , zˆgt are such the marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zˆat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zˆat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˆat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zˆgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
zˆat + zˆgt = A(Zˆat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zˆgt−1)f(e, e)kL
Therefore, the optimal investment plan for [t, t] (call it IP ∗
t
) is characterized by the
three inequalities and the investment plan {za, zg} above21.
21See also Appendix II for the possible cases when some of the above inequalities are violated.
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Stage 4: [t, t∗]
Similarly to stage 3, define t∗ such that:
∂A(Za)
∂Za
[
e∗iat(Za) + e
∗
jat(Za)
]( T∑
s=t∗
δs−t∗
)
=
∂Γ(Zgt∗ )
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t∗
δs−t∗
)
= 1
Also assume that:
∂A(Za)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
∂Γ(Zgt)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− c− c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zˇat−1)
(
e∗ia(Zˇat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˇat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zˇgt−1) (f(e, e)v − 2c)
]
>
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zat−1)
(
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zgt−1) (f(e, e)v − c− c)
]
These conditions are equivalent to the conditions specified for periods [t, t]. The first
two ensure that investment in productivity of good a and g are optimal after t = t. At
this point of time, there is adequate production of the autarchic good so that subsidizing
the effort levels of both types is feasible. As before, subsidizing both agents is optimal
if it generates greater overall utility than subsidizing only one agent, which, given the
conditions we have specified thus far, is better than no subsidization for any type. The
required assumption for this result is the third condition. Call the optimal investment
plan until t∗ as IP ∗t∗ . IP
∗
t∗ incorporates all the previous optimal investment plans up to
t plus the investment plan {zˇat, zˇgt} thereafter. This is given below:
zˇgt = A(Zˇat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zˇgt), Zˇgt = Zˇgt−1 + zˇgt, zˇat = 0
if ∂A(Zˇat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zˇat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˇat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zˇgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zˇat > 0 and zˇat , zˇgt are such marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zˇat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗iat(Zˇat−1) + e
∗
jat(Zˇat)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zˇgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
,
zˇat + zˇgt = A(Zˇat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zˇgt−1)
The plan {zat, zgt} follows the same growth path and is subject to the same feasibility
constraints as the optimal plan for the periods [t, t]. Of course, by the third inequality
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above, it is suboptimal to {zˇat, zˇgt}, and is not part of the equilibrium path (See also
Appendix II for the cases where the inequalities above do not hold).
Stage 5: [t∗, T ]
After t∗ investment falls to zero, since the marginal utility increase by additional in-
vestment in either types of physical capital is lower than the marginal cost of fore-
gone consumption. In this case, agents receive subsidies whenever they trade, pay
taxes whenever they do not trade and consume the remainder of the production.
The evolution of regulation depends on the investment path for Zg and the opti-
mally induced effort levels. Recall that the maximum permitted transfers are given
by p = Γ(Zgt)
(
kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(ei,e)−f(ei,e)
)
.
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Figure 3: Capital-Accumulation Paths
Figures 3 and 4 give the graphical representation of the economy according to the
29
aaa ZZZ <<
~
p
t~ t t
t*t
No trade
No enforcement 
institutions
No regulation
Trade
Enforcement 
institutions
No regulation
Trade
Enforcement 
institutions
Partial subsidies 
and regulation
Trade
Enforcement 
institutions
Full subsidies  
and regulation
Taxation and 
investment stop
Regulation 
remains 
unchanged 
Figure 4: Maximum enforceable tranfers
conditions above. A first note is that they are drawn as if time is continuous. While
our model is one of discrete time, the figures can be closely approximated if T takes
sufficiently high values. Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium path of capital stocks Za
and Zg and Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium path of contract law, as represented by
the maximum enforceable transfer p. These graphs also present the different stages of
economic development.
To recapitulate, during [0, t˜] productivity Za is very low and trade is infeasible.
There is no need for enforcement institutions or regulation and taxation is used in
increasing Za. This stage reflects a rather primitive stage of economic organization.
In stage [t˜+1, t] trade becomes feasible and enforcement institutions are required to
support it by making private agreements enforceable. However, providing tax-breaks
to agents in order to incentivize high effort remains infeasible and hence regulation is
still not required. Any agreement on exchanging specialized goods is enforceable. On
30
the other hand, public spending can be used for increasing both types of capital stock,
but, since the marginal increase in productivity of g is much higher than the marginal
productivity of good a, taxation flows only to the former. This continues until effective
marginal returns are equalized, which depends on parameter values.
In periods [t + 1, t], Za exceeds the threshold value Za and partial (one-type) sub-
sidization of trade takes place. At this point of development, limitations on the set
of enforceable transfers are set in order to make tax-breaks effective in inducing high
effort. Thus the probability of trade increases for each group. On average, trade and
its marginal value increase as well, which induces greater investment in Zg. This is
shown in the diagram by the kink in the slope of Zg at period t. In our model, higher
investment in Zg also means that the optimal stopping time for investment t
∗ is delayed.
Moreover, as Γt increases, p also increases, which means that regulation is initially se-
vere but it is subsequently relaxed. This is an important stage of the development
process, where one can see the interaction between contract law, specialization and
productivity growth and could be loosely interpreted as a stage akin to merchantilism
before industrialization22.
The next stage, [t+1, t∗], is the stage where the economy develops fully its productive
capacity. Investments in Za and Zg reach their peak in t
∗ and tax-breaks are given
to both types. The feedback effect between contract law and productivity is repeated.
Furthermore, as Figure 4 depicts, if f(e, e)−f(e, e) > f(e, e)−f(e, e), then contract law
tightens again (p decreases). This gives rise to a non-monotonic pattern of regulation
over time, which may explain why it is difficult in empirical studies to find a robust
effect between contractual institutions and growth.
Finally, the remaining periods of the economy, [t∗+1, T ], represent a fully developed
economy. Capital stocks and trade have reached their optimum level and taxation is
used solely for inducing high effort levels. The remainder of production is used for
consumption purposes.
22It is also noteworthy to mention that Landes (1998) provides evidence that, despite common beliefs,
the medieval period experienced a rapid increase in the productivity of the agricultural sector. This
is in line with the argument made here that the initial growth in productivity of the non-specialized
sector precedes specialization and the period of severe regulation.
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4.5 The non-monotonicity between enforcement costs and de-
velopment
As we mentioned in the introduction, one of the purposes of the paper is to show
that enforcement costs may not be monotonically related to economic growth and,
therefore, the empirical specification by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) may not be the
appropriate one for testing the relationship between contract law and development. As
we have shown in the previous subsection, it is possible that the evolution of regulation
is non-monotonic over the process of economic development. That is, there may be
periods where regulation is relaxed and the contractual space expands, while other
periods where the contractual space shrinks (as shown in Figure 4).
If this is the case, and if one makes the additional (and plausible) assumption, that
contract enforcement costs are positively correlated with the set of enforceable agree-
ments, then it follows that contract enforcement costs may not be positively correlated
with growth. Of course, in our model, for theoretical reasons, we have implicitly as-
sumed that contract enforcement costs are zero. This helped us to contrast our results,
where the limits on contractual space arise endogenously, with the results of the pre-
vious literature, where, due to exogenous enforcement costs, the contractual space is
incomplete. But we can modify our model to include strictly positive enforcement costs.
Consider the following modification of our model. Assume that in the economy
there are two categories of ploughs. Those which are described by our model and
which suffer from a hold-up problem in their production, and another category, which
is unaffected by any hold-up considerations. However, the second variety of ploughs
(call them the class-two ploughs), varies in terms of its value for the farmer, while it has
a constant cost k2. Say that, for class-two, v is distributed uniformly between [0 , v],
with v > max{pt}. Furthermore, a plough of class-two may turn out to be defective
after its sale, in which case the farmer can ask for a refund, if he proves his case in the
court. This is necessary, if his output in terms of wheat can be verified by the court
but not the seller (as is usually the case).
In this economy, as long as the class-two category is not too large a fraction of trade
(so that the ex-post inefficiencies generated by banning some of these exchanges are not
too large), it is still optimal to not allow some contracts from being written in equi-
librium (for optimal incentives in the production of class-one ploughs). Moreover, the
dynamic evolution of contract law is still represented by Figure 4 (under the relevant
conditions) and the aggregate transactions for ploughs of class-two are positively corre-
lated with pt. As a consequence, the number of cases brought to courts and aggregate
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enforcement costs are positively correlated with the design of contract law (pt) as well.
Of course, the plausibility of the result depends on the credibility of the assumptions.
But still the assumption (the positive correlation between contract-enforcement
costs and the set of enforceable agreements) can be justified in terms of intuition.
This is because one expects that the greater the aggregate number of transactions in an
economy, the greater the number of cases that end up in courts and hence the higher the
aggregate enforcement costs (and the costs per case, due to the dis-economies of scale
exhibited by bureaucracies). And the aggregate number of transactions is expected to
be positively correlated with the size of the set of permissible transactions. Of course,
these hypotheses, though plausible, remain to be tested empirically as well.
4.6 Discussion
As we mentioned before, the institutional agent stands for a governor or a monarch,
who is bound by the agreement she has made with the rest of the citizens in period zero.
She agent plays a double role in this economy. The standard economic role implied by
most models of public economics is the role of the government, which collects taxes and
allocates public expenditures in economic activities where the market mechanism fails
to provide efficient outcomes. In our model, investment in the production technology
is a public good, due to the assumption of the continuum of agents and the assumption
that productivity parameters are economy-wide.
The second role of the institutional agent is her role as an enforcement authority for
private agreements. As we have shown, in the setup of this paper, it may not always
be optimal for the enforcement authority to guarantee the conduct of trade, unlike
the previous literature. Because agents are perfectly rational, they will never honor
their part of agreement when they know that it will not be enforced on them. Hence
making some private agreements non-enforceable is equivalent to effectively forbidding
them. So one can interpret the endogenously determined set of non-enforceable private
agreements as laws of banning some types of transactions and, as we have shown, this
can have a positive effect on social welfare.
Overall, the analysis of this subsection presents an economy which moves through
all the stages of development. It starts from a point where production is limited to
activities who do not suffer from hold-up problems, it moves to a period where trade
begins and enforcement authorities are necessary and finally it ends up in a stage with
limitations on enforceable agreements (regulation). Furthermore, the resources spent for
incentivizing agents to exert high effort is proportional to the productivity parameter
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Γt and hence as the value of trade grows so do the optimal subsidies. This can be
interpreted as an endogenous growth of enforcement institutions, at least in terms of
the resources devoted to their cause. Moreover, the exertion of high effort increases the
marginal value of trade and, as a consequence, it increases the threshold value for the
capital stock Zg. This implies that the overall investments made in the productivity
of trade are higher and this generates a positive feedback loop from economic growth
to contract law and back to economic growth. In other words, our model provides a
formalization of the argument that growth and law are inexorably entangled and the
development of one has consequences for the other.
5 Conclusion
The main purpose of the paper is to relate the process of economic development with the
emergence and evolution of enforcement institutions and contract law. We demonstrate
the importance of restrictions on enforceable agreements for increasing social welfare
and growth. In equilibrium, the relationship between economic growth and the inten-
sity of regulation may be non-monotonic and this may explain why empirical studies
do not find a positive correlation between enforcement institutions and development.
Finally, our model derives the design of enforcement institutions and the centralization
of authority as equilibria phenomena.
We believe that our model can be extended in various directions in order to explain
different phenomena related to the process of economic development, institutional de-
sign and regulation. Notice that in the models of section 2 and 3, there is no loss of
efficiency. Despite the fact that regulation is necessary, all socially valuable transactions
take place in equilibrium. So regulation does not impose any cost from an efficiency
point view, which goes against standard economic theory and intuition. However, we
can extend the model to incorporate multiple sources of trade among agents. In this
case, regulation generates social value by underpinning the mechanism, which induces
optimal incentives, but destroys social value by forbidding some welfare enhancing
transactions. The trade-off between incentives and economic freedom is even more
clear in the extended model. We believe that we can use this more elaborate model of
the design of optimal regulation in order to explain the differences in regulatory regimes
that we observe between economies.
Furthermore, our model can be modified in order to generate a theory of regu-
lation cycles. In the current form of the model, the set of enforceable agreements
changes whenever the number of agents, who need to be incentivized to exert high
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effort, changes. But in a model with a stream of new traded good being introduced at
different stages of economic development, the introduction of a new good is associated
with a tightening of regulatory restrictions, which are subsequently relaxed. This cycle
is then repeated every time a new good is introduced. Thus, we can have a model
of regulation cycles which are related to the process of innovation and technological
advance.
Similarly, the model can be used to relate the role of enforcement institutions with
the degree of specialization in the economy and the organizational complexity by assum-
ing that new production processes require the cooperation of a larger set of individuals
who face a multi-agent version of the hold-up problem. This model is able to generate
regulation cycles and relate the degree of specialization to the existence of appropriate
institutional restrictions at the same time.
Another assumption that we can relax is the assumption of the mutual exclusivity
between productive and governmental activities. By allowing institutional agents to
have a certain span of control, which they have to allocate between their institutional
and their economic role, we can provide a more rigorous analysis of how and under
what conditions centralization of power emerges. This can provide us with a more
complete theory of institutional size and how it may vary along the development path
of an economy.
For all the above reasons, we believe that our model is an interesting contribution
to the literature, which highlights the importance of enforcement institutions to the
process of development, and we believe that this research area is a fruitful ground for
future work.
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Appendix I
Proposition 1: Let p = kH + βj(v − kL) − c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) . Consider the social contract
S∗, which defines:
i) if trade of good g takes place, agent ξ receives subsidy (negative taxation)
τξ1 = (1− f(e, e))
(
βξ(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
< 0.
ii) if trade of good g does not takes place, agent ξ pays out taxation
τξ0 = f(e, e)
(
−βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
> 0.
iii) any private contract pi(0, pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or qˆ > p − p is non-
enforceable.
Then S∗ implements the first best effort levels and it is renegotiation-proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: Without any subsidization of effort, the farmer and the
producer will trade the good only in the low-cost state at the expected price p =
(1− βi)v − βikL. The expected utility from trade is v − p = βi(v − kL) for the farmer
and p− kL = (1− βi)(v − kL) for the plough-maker.
Agent ξ exerts high effort in the production of good g if the expected utility of high
effort is higher than the expected utility of low effort. Assuming that trade takes place
at the expected price and given the beliefs of ξ for the effort level of ζ:
eξ = e⇔ f(e, eζ) (βξ(v − kL)− τξ1)+(1−f(e, eζ))(−τξ0)−c > f(e, eζ) (βξ(v − kL)− τξ1)+
(1− f(e, eζ))(−τξ0)− c⇔
τξ0 − τξ1 > −βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,eζ)−f(e,eζ)
Since we require both agents to exert high effort23: τξ0 − τξ1 > −βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) .
This expression gives the minimum required wedge between taxation in the two states
in order to induce high effort for ξ. Notice that the right hand side of the inequality
is positive due to the condition imposed by inequality (1) in section 2. On the other
hand, incentive compatibility requires that the producer of the good, who suffers from
the high production costs in state H, does not want to trade in that state. The farmer
may be willing to offer him an increased price in order to cover the high production
cost, in which case incentive compatibility is impossible to satisfy without restrictions
23One may worry that coordination failures are possible if both agents believe that the other agent
will exert low effort level and if f(e, e) − f(e, e) > f(e, e) − f(e, e). In this case we can define the
difference between taxation levels in terms of the min{f(e, e)−f(e, e) , f(e, e)−f(e, e)}. This ensures
that it is a strictly dominant strategy for each agent to exert high effort.
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on the transfers that the two agents can do. Indeed, if the farmer pays an expected
price pˆ, incentive compatibility for the producer requires(notice that in this case, since
we are referring to the producer, ξ = j):
pˆ− kH − τj1 6 −τj0 ⇔ τj0 − τj1 6 kH − pˆ
Combining the two inequalities above, the combination of incentive compatibility
and effort exertion conditions, gives:
−βj(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) 6 kH − pˆ⇔
pˆ 6 kH + βj(v − kL)− c− c
f(e, e)− f(e, e) (16)
Any net transfer of resources higher than the right hand side of (16) will lead to
violation of incentive compatibility and trade in the high cost state, which then leads
to low-effort exertion. This is because agents know that they will trade and receive the
subsidies in any state of the world. Let p = kH + βj(v − kL) − c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) . First, note
that p is greater than the fair price p:
p > p⇔ kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) > (1− βi)v + βikL ⇔ kH − kL > c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
The inequality above holds, due to the assumptions of the model and inequality (1):
kH − kL > v − kL > c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
Since p > p, the producer will not accept to trade in the high cost state without
receiving an additional payment above the “fair” price. So violation of incentive com-
patibility from one side requires a higher exchange price or a side contract, actions
which themselves are verifiable. Second, the farmer is willing to pay a price as high,
because the utility of trading under this price is greater than the utility of not-trading:
v − p− τi1 > τi0 ⇔ v − kH − βj(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) − (τi0 − τi1) > 0⇔
kL − kH + 2 c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) > 0 , which holds due to inequality (3) in section 2.
Therefore, inducing high-effort exertion and incentive compatibility, require that
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any transfer pˆ > p or any side-payment qˆ > p−p is non-enforceable. Required taxation
conditional on trade is given by:
τξ0 − τξ1 > −βξ(v − kL) + c− c
f(e, e)− f(e, e) (17)
f(e, e)τξ1 + (1− f(e, e))τξ0 = 0 (18)
This system provides the required taxation levels as given by the proposition. We
turn now to the issue of renegotiation-proofness. Consider first the ex-post renegotia-
tion. If the low-cost state arises then the farmer and the producer can enforce the trade
and receive the subsidies by making the same trade agreement as the one they would
have made in the absence of the social contract. This provides them the maximum ex-
post payoff. Therefore, any renegotiation of the social contract can not increase their
payoffs and agents have no incentive to renegotiate it with the institutional agent. If
the high-cost state arises, then the two agents can increase their pay-offs if they modify
the social contract so that private contracts are enforceable. In such a case, net trans-
fers of resources between the two agents are allowed and they can extract the subsidies
by trading at the pre-specified price p, even though this is suboptimal. Since it is the
institutional agent who bears the true cost of this sub-optimal transaction, both i and j
would agree on it. However, the institutional agent anticipates the renegotiation of the
social contract in the bad state. Furthermore, any credible reward the agents are willing
to provide to him in order to agree to renegotiate does not cover for the losses by paying
out the subsidies. Therefore, the institutional agent does not agree to renegotiate the
social contract in period 4.
A similar type of argument shows that the institutional agent does not agree to
renegotiate the social contract in the interim stage. 
Proposition 2 below provides the necessary conditions for the implementation of
first-best effort levels. It is proven for a more general environment, where effort levels are
continuous and hence inequalities (1)-(2) are not necessary. Condition (3) is substituted
for v− kL > kH − v, but the interpretation and role is the same. Due to the Revelation
Principle, we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms S, where agents send messages
about the state of the world and the mechanism determines if the good is traded or
not, at what price and if subsidies are given.
Proposition 2: The existence of the institutional agent and the non-enforcement of
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private contracts contingent on trade are necessary conditions for the implementation
of first-best effort levels.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we prove that any renegotiation-proof mechanism S
that does not include an institutional agent (Σ = Ø) can not implement the first-best
effort levels. Consider any direct mechanism S( . ,Σ = Ø), and assume that the mech-
anism infers that the cost is low if the agents send the messages mˆ. Implementation of
the first-best effort levels requires that trade takes place and appropriate subsidies are
provided only in the low-cost state. Therefore, in terms of ex-post utility, the combi-
nation of incentive compatibility and efficiency requires:
ui(mˆi, mˆj|kL) = v − kL > ui(m′i, mˆj|kL), ∀m′i (19)
uj(mˆj, mˆi|kL) = v − kL > uj(m′j, mˆi|kL),∀m′j (20)
uξ(m˜ξ, mˆζ |kH) = 0 > uξ(mˆξ, mˆζ |kH), for some m˜ξ 6= mˆξ and for some ξ ∈ {i, j} (21)
uζ(mζ , m˜ξ|kH) = 0 ,∀mζ and ζ 6= ξ (22)
Inequalities (19) and (20) imply that the aggregate subsidy given in the low-cost state
is equal to the surplus:
∑
ξ
sξ = v − kL. Inequalities (21) and (22) require that at least
one of the agents has the incentive not to trade if the high-cost state arises, while the
other does not benefit from the non occurrence of trade.
If the mechanism S( . ,Σ = Ø) allows for private contracts, contingent on messages
(the equivalent of private contracts conditional on trade), (21) can not be satisfied.
This is because
∑
ξ
sξ = v − kL > kH − v and therefore there is always a private
contract pi(mˆi, q, ∅) such that uξ(mˆξ, mˆζ |kH) + q > 0 for both agents. Without loss
of generality, assume that S( . ,Σ = Ø) specifies a price p (not necessarily equal to
(1 − βi)v + βikL), if g is traded, and subsidies {si, sj}, which satisfy (19) and (20).
Then ui(mˆi, mˆj|kH) = v − p + si, uj(mˆj, mˆi|kH) = p − kH + sj and ui(mˆi, mˆj|kH) +
uj(mˆj, mˆi|kH) = v − kH +
∑
ξ
sξ = (v − kL) − (kH − v) > 0. Therefore, there exists
a net-transfer q and a private contract pi(mˆξ, p, ∅) such that ui(mˆi, mˆj|kH) + q > 0
and uj(mˆj, mˆi|kH) − q > 0, which violates the incentive compatibility-cum-efficiency
condition.
If, on the other-hand, S( . ,Σ = Ø) does not allow for the enforcement of private
contracts, then there are two possibilities. Either inequality (21) can not be satisfied,
in which case the result of the proposition holds, or (21) is satisfied. In this case,
however, M is not ex-post renegotiation proof, because there exists another mechanism
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S ′( . ,Σ = Ø), which allows for private contract enforcement and makes both agents
better off, as shown above. This completes the first part of the proposition, namely that
the existence of the institutional agent is a necessary condition for the implementation
of the first-best effort levels.
The necessity of the non-enforcement of the private contracts follows from the first
part of the proof. Even if the mechanism specifies an institutional agent, inequalities
(19)-(22) must still be satisfied, and with enforceable agreements of the form pi(m, q, ∅),
we already showed how (21) is violated. 
Lemma 1: The optimal social contract S∗ determines that the set Σ is of measure
zero. That is, the total number of institutional agents is infinitesimal compared to the
aggregate population.
Proof: Formally, S∗ = arg max
S
{mi(S)Ui +mj(S)Uj +mΣSr+σ }, where mi(S) is the mass
of agents of type i who engage in productive activities according to S, mj(S) is the
mass of type j agents, who engage in productive activities, and mΣ(S) is the mass of
institutional agents set by S.
We show that any contract S, which assigns strictly positive mass to the set of
institutional agents can not be socially optimal and will be not chosen. To see this,
consider the social contract S(Σ,Φ(Q), τ, za, zg), with mΣ > 0. Let S
′ be another
social contract which specifies exactly the same taxation and investment schemes as
S (τ ′ = τ , z′a = za , z
′
g = zg), has the same set of enforceable contracts Φ(Q), but
specifies a smaller set of institutional agents Σ′, subset of Σ (Σ′ ⊂ Σ⇒ mΣ′ < mΣ). S ′
also provides the same rewards r as S to all agent in the set Σ, even though some of the
agents in this set are not institutional agents according to S ′. In other words, S ′ keeps
exactly the same vector of transfers of S but shrinks the set of institutional agents.
Then S ′ provides a Pareto improvement over S. This is because all agents who are
occupied in productive activities under S continue to pay the same taxation and receive
the same benefits from productivity investments in S ′, so their utility is unchanged.
Also the institutional agents in the set Σ′ are equally well-off as in S. But the agents
in the set Σ − Σ′ are made better off because they receive the same reward as before,
plus they are occupied in productive activities under S ′ and receive all the marginal
benefits of their own production: S ′ is a Pareto improvement over S. Hence, any social
contract with positive measure of institutional agents can not be part of the equilibrium
strategies of the game. 
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Lemma 2: The optimal social contract specifies the following rewards and punishments
for the institutional agent: {r+σt, r−σt} = {(A(Zat)e∗σa − cia0(e∗σa)), 12A(Zat)(e∗iat + e∗jat)},
with e∗ξat being the optimal effort level for type ξ in period t.
Proof: Suppose that some social contract S is proposed in period t. The reward
r+σt for the proposed institutional agent σ in period t must be at least as large as the
discounted value of production of the good a that σ can produce in period t. Otherwise,
she can vote against the proposal and receive her autarchic production. Therefore, in
order to achieve the agreement of the institutional agent, the optimal social contract
must set r+σt equal to (A(Zat)e
∗
σa − cia0(e∗σa)), where e∗σa is such that ∂cσa0∂eσa = A(Zat).
On the other hand, the optimal social contract minimizes the resources allocated to
non-productive activities, hence r+σ can not be greater. These two conditions imply
that r+σt = δ
t(A(Zat)e
∗
σa − cia0(e∗σa)), where e∗σa : ∂cσa0∂eσa = A(Zat).
r−σ must be set sufficiently high, so as to prevent the institutional agent from not
complying with the contract. Since the greatest amount of resources that the governor
can extract from the economy is the aggregate production of the autarchic good, setting
r−σt equal to
1
2
A(Zat)(e
∗
iat+e
∗
jat) is sufficient for making the governor to comply with her
role in period t. The above mean that the rewards and punishments must increase with
the increase in the productivity of the economy for the non-specialized good and the
aggregate exerted effort level in its production. This generates the optimal punishment
plan {r+σ , r−σ }, which is a vector with elements r+σt(A(Zat)) and r−σt(A(Zat)) for t ∈
[0, T ].
Proposition 3: Let p = Γ(Zgt−1)
(
kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
. Incentive compati-
bility requires that any private contract pi(pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or qˆ > p− p
is non-enforceable.
Proof: The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix I. Incentive
compatibility for type j requires that she prefers not to trade in the high cost state
than to trade, which implies that p + q − ΓtkH − τj1t 6 −τj0t. At the same time,
the difference in taxation conditional on trade must be sufficiently high so that agent
j prefers to exert high effort. The condition is given by equation (6) in section 4.1.
Combining the two conditions gives the condition that p+ q 6 p. 
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Appendix II
The figures in the following three pages present diagrammatically all the possible cases
of investment plans. We do not derive the conditions under which these paths arise, but
the required analysis is similar to section 4.4. The cases depend on the size of the three
critical values Z˜a, Za and Za. In each case, we describe the optimal investment path in
terms of: i) its duration (as provided by the endogenous thresholds t˜, t, t and t∗), ii) for
which goods is the productivity increased through investments in the respective capital
stocks, and iii) for how many types of agents is effort exertion subsidized. Recall that
if only one type of agent receives a taxation-break, then this is the type with the lowest
bargaining power.
aaa ZZZ
~
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Figure 5: Case I
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Case III:
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